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Book Reviews and Notices 
The Relentless Business of Treaties: How Indigenous Land Became U.S. Prop-
erty, by Martin Case. Saint Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 
2018. 215 pp. Sidebars, notes, bibliography, index. $17.95 paperback. 
Reviewer David A. Nichols is professor of history at Indiana State University. 
He is the author of Peoples of the Inland Sea: Native Americans and Newcomers 
in the Great Lakes Region, 1600–1870 (2018) and Engines of Diplomacy: Indian 
Trading Factories and the Negotiation of American Empire (2016). 
Francis Paul Prucha, the dean of U.S. Indian policy historians, once re-
ferred to American Indian treaties as “a political anomaly.” When one 
looks at these agreements in an international context, it becomes clear 
that he had a point. From the eighteenth century to the twentieth, 
European settler societies rarely used this formal legal device to extract 
land cessions from indigenous peoples. Colonial officials in Australia 
signed no treaties with Aboriginal nations, New Zealanders made only 
one with the Maoris, Boers in South Africa concluded about half a 
dozen treaty-like agreements with their African neighbors, and officials 
in Canada negotiated a couple of dozen accords with First Nations 
there. The United States was the great exception: its officials signed 
nearly 400 treaties with American Indians between 1778 and 1871. The 
sheer scope of American treaty making, at a time when other empires 
considered indigenous treaties obsolescent, demands some explanation, 
some answer to the question, “Why?” 
 Martin Case thinks that the best way to explain the why of treaties 
is to start with the who of them. He has spent the past decade pursuing 
what he calls the Treaty Signers Project, an effort to identify and classify 
all of the 2,300 men who signed treaties with American Indians on be-
half of the United States. Those signatories did not make laws or write 
high-level policy directives, but they did directly negotiate with, cajole, 
bribe, and threaten the Indian chiefs and councilors who signed treaties 
on their nations’ behalf. They also drafted or significantly modified the 
documents that the U.S. Senate eventually ratified. They effectively 
served as the foot soldiers of federal policy and American Indian dis-
possession. Some were actual soldiers, or rather U.S. Army officers who 
had once fought alongside or against their indigenous counterparts. 
The majority of commissioners (75 percent) were private traders, men 
who had both business and family relationships with the Native peo-
ples whose lands the United States sought. They themselves frequently 
benefited from treaty clauses that gave them individual land grants or 
set aside annuity money to pay Indians’ commercial debts. Traders and 
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army officers also exploited their personal knowledge of the territories 
that Native Americans ceded, using that knowledge and their own cap-
ital to speculate in newly ceded lands or market their resources: timber, 
mines, mill seats, railroad thoroughfares. Henry Dodge, for example, a 
militia officer who negotiated Sauk and Meskwaki land cessions (in-
cluding eastern Iowa), made part of his fortune as a lead miner in those 
nations’ old homeland.  
 Land cession treaties thus had almost magical properties: they 
helped transform fur traders and down-at-the-heels officers into wealthy 
real-estate tycoons, mining barons, bankers, and financiers. With wealth 
came a desire for respectability, which some treaty signatories manu-
factured by founding state historical societies and writing histories. 
They cast themselves as heroic champions of Manifest Destiny and de-
scribed the Native Americans they impoverished and displaced as ata-
visms, doomed to retreat before the advancing fire of white civilization. 
Their self-serving narrative of American land acquisition became the 
dominant one in the United States until the late twentieth century. 
 Case’s database on this giant pack of land pirates remains a work 
in progress, but within the pages of Relentless Business the author gives 
us more than enough names, professions, and personal details to sup-
port his conclusions. Like all good craftworkers, Case defines and justi-
fies his book as much by what he leaves out as by what he includes. 
Preferring to start a conversation rather than join a pre-existing one, he 
does not engage much with prior scholarship on American Indian trea-
ties, resting his study’s significance instead on the scholarly spadework 
that went into it. He also moves to the background the 8,300 American 
Indian men who signed or marked treaties on their peoples’ behalf. That 
is a justifiable position, since those signatories belonged to dozens of 
different nations with different agendas, whereas the American cohort 
represented a single nation-state and a coherent set of interests and were, 
despite their numbers, a group with strong interpersonal connections. 
Indeed, as the author notes, “at least one-third” of the U.S. signatories 
“were related by blood or marriage to other treaty signers” (102). That 
some of these marital and blood alliances actually ran through Amer-
ican Indian families, a point Case mentions briefly (109), suggests one 
path that later scholars might follow if they choose to analyze the larger 
and more diffuse group of American Indian treaty signatories—namely, 
they can look at the family connections that treaty commissioners used 
to win their Indian counterparts’ trust and that those counterparts 
used to share resistance strategies with leaders in other nations, or (as 
the Meskwakis did in Iowa) recruit white allies to their struggle to retain 
their homelands.  
